Badiou speaks about why man is more than just an animal...An immortal: this is what the worst situations that can be inflicted upon Man show him to be, in so far as he distinguishes himself within the varied and rapacious flux of life. In order to think any aspect of Man, we must begin from this principle. So, if 'rights of man' exist, they are surely not rights of life against death, or rights of survival against misery. They are the rights of the Immortal, affirmed in their own right, or the rights of the Infinite, exercised over the contingency of suffering and death. The fact that in the end we all die, that only dust remains, in no way alters Man's identity as immortal at the instant in which he affirms himself as someone who runs counter to the temptation of wanting-to-be-an-animal to which circumstances may expose him. And we know that every human being is capable of being this immortal - unpredictably, be it in circumstances great or small, for truths important or secondary. In each case, subjectivation is immortal, and makes Man. Beyond this there is only a biological species, a 'biped without feathers', whose charms are not obvious.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Badiou on the Immortal singularity of man
Tuesday, October 09, 2007
Socrates' Apology
Quotes from the Apology. I always choose what means most to me... hope you like them.
You remember Chaerephon's character - how impulsive he was in carrying through whatever he took in hand. Once he went to Delphi and ventured to put this question to the oracle - I entreat you again, my friends, not to interrupt me with your shouts - he asked if there was anyone who was wiser than I. The priestess answered that there was no one. Chaerephon himself is dead, but his brother here will witness to what I say.
Now see why I tell you this. I am going to explain to you how the prejudice against me has arisen. When I heard of the oracle I began to reflect: What can the god mean by this riddle? I know very well that I am not wise, even in the smallest degree. [...]
I went to a man who was reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the answer wrong, and meaning to point out to the oracle its mistake, and to say, "You said that I was the wisest of men, but this man is wiser than I am." So I examined the man, but this was the result, Athenians. When I conversed with him I came to see that, though a great many persons, and most of all himself thought that he was wise, yet he was not wise. Then I tried to prove to him that he was not wise, though he fancied that he was. By so doing I made him indignant {like a gadfly, how my phil teacher called him :D}, and many of the bystanders. So when I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man: neither of us knows anything that is really worth knowing, but he thinks that he has knowledge when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I have. I seem, at any rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point: I do not think that I know what I do not know."
[...]
From this examination, Athenians, has arisen much fierce and bitter indignation, and as a result a great many prejudices about me. People say that I am "a wise man." For the bystanders always think that I am wise myself in any matter wherein I refute another. But, gentlemen, I believe that the god is really wise, and that by this oracle he meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. I do not think that he meant that Socrates was wise. He only made use of my name, and took me as an example, as though he would say to men, "He, among you, is the wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is really worth nothing at all."
When the generals whom you chose to command me, Athenians, assigned me my station during the battles of Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, I remained where they stationed me and ran the risk of death, like other men. It would e very strange conduct on my part if I were to desert my station now from fear of death or of any other thing when the god has commanded me - as I am persuaded that he has done - to spend my life in searching for wisdom, and in examining myself and others. [...] For to fear death, my friends, is only to think ourselves wise without really being wise, for it is to think that we know what we do not know. For no one knows whether death may not be the greatest good that can happen to a man. But men fear it as if they knew quite well that it was the greatest of evils. And what is this but that shameful ignorance of thinking that we know what we do not know?"
Even if you acquit me now, and do not listen to Anytus' argument that, if I am to be acquitted, I ought never to have been brought to trial at all, and that, as it is, you are bound to put me to death because, as he said, if I escape, all your sons will be utterly corrupted by practicing what Socrates teaches. If you were therefore to say to me, "Socrates, this time we will not listen to Anytus. We will let you go, but on the condition that you give up this investigation of yours, and philosophy. If you are found following these pursuits again, you shall die." I say, if you offered to let me go, on these terms, I should reply: "Athenians, I hold you in the highest regard and affection, but I will be persuaded by the god rather than you. As long as I have breath and strength I will not give up philosophy and exhorting you and declaring the truth to every one of you whom I meet, saying, as I am accustomed."
He is condemned to death.
I have been convicted because I was wanting, not in arguments, but in impudence and shamelessness - because I would not plead before you as you would have liked to hear me plead, or appeal to you with weeping and wailing, or say and do many other things which I maintain are unworthy of me, but which you have been accustomed from other men."
Although some of Socrates' arguments are reductive, the famous wise man described by Plato is highly regarded as one of the most notable figures in philosophy (not to mention ancient philosophy). The Greek system of laws and judges was amazing :)
So, what do you think?:)
Sunday, October 07, 2007
facing ancient philosophy
By explaining generation and destruction, if not all change, in terms of mixture and separation, Empedocles sought to reconcile Heraclitus's insistence on the reality of change with the Eleatic claim that generation and destruction are unthinkable. Going back to the Greeks' traditional belief in four elements, he found a place for Thales' water, Anaximenes' air, and Heraclitus's fire, and he added earth as the fourth. In addition to these four elements, which Aristotle would later call "material causes" Empedocles postulated two "efficient causes": strife (Heraclitus's great principle) and love. He envisaged four successive ages: an age of love or perfect mixture in the beginning; then gradual separation as strife enters; then complete separation as strife rules; finally, as love enters again, a gradual remixture.
How romantic... :X Four elements + two causes of everything, babe.Anaxagoras taught that everything consists of an infinite number of particles or seeds, and that in all things there is a portion of everything. Hair could not come from what is not hair, nor flesh come from what is not flesh. The names we apply to things are determined by the preponderance of certain seeds in them - for example, hair seeds or flesh seeds. Like Empedocles, he added to such "material causes" an "efficient cause" to account for the motion and direction of things; however, unlike Empedocles' two, Anaxagoras added only one "efficient cause", which was mind,
Could Buddhism be a li'l related to this Atomism accepted Parmenides' idea that being must be one seamless whole but posited an infinite number of such "one's." According to Democritus, the world is made up of tiny "un-cutables"
- about Democritus
And death is always so romantic, no matter how you put it... Did you ever think about that?
I think that...
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
Thought to question everything?
My first post after upgrading to blogger beta!
Hello ... world!
I've lived this past few weeks... without writing one single bit. And now I'm here, wishing ... for what? Inspiration, I guess. Time is so slow... yet so fast...
No matter, I've good subjects to write on now: Nietzsche (hard to spell right), and, of course, me...
Nietzsche said that humans have killed God... but how?
The following is from here, an excerpt of Nietzsche's "The Gay Science". If you want to read more, follow the link, or go here for a summary of Nietzsche's morality.
Quote:
The Madman. Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place calling out unceasingly: "I seek God! I seek God!" As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. Why? is he lost? said one. Has he strayed away like a child? said another. Or does he keep himself hidden? Is he afraid of us? Has he taken a sea voyage? Has he emigrated? - the people cried out laughingly, all in a hubbub. The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? - for even Gods putrefy! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife - who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we cleanse ourselves? What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There never was a greater event - and on account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto!" Here the madman was silent and looked again at his hearers; they also were silent and looked at him in surprise. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was extinguished. "I come too early," e then said. "I am not yet at the right time. This prodigious event is still on its way, and is traveling - it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest star - and yet they have done it themselves!" It is further stated that the madman made his way into different churches on the same day, and there intoned his Requiem aeternam deo. When led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: "What are these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?"
EndQuote
Nietzsche was a strange man, and ... you can see that if you read through the links. I'm too digressive and unfocused right now to pursue further inward Nietzsche's philosophy, but what I get from the tiny bits of material that I've read ... is a strong cohesion between ideas. There's a pessimism, and a strange state of trance. it's amazing how clear everything he says is... he is the kind of practical-direct philosopher, perhaps...
I wrote my reaction paper on him, below, on another piece of his philosophy:
Quote:
Nietzsche
One of the most influential and misunderstood philosophers of the modern era, Nietzsche criticized, among other things, Christianity. An interesting quote that I found on him was the following: “Never yield to remorse, but at once tell yourself: remorse would simply mean adding to the first act of stupidity a second.”(The Wanderer and his Shadow,s. 323, R.J. Hollingdale translation). This quote connects so well with Nietzsche’s sayings about the Eternal Recurrence!
Nietzsche resurrects the problem of recurrence (of life): What if everything was to repeat itself indefinitely? What if a demon came to us and said: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more”, he proposes. As Heidegger pointed out, Nietzsche never speaks about the reality of "eternal recurrence" itself, but about the "thought of eternal recurrence." (Wikipedia) As a matter of fact, anyone who has seen the movie “Groundhog Day” pretty much knows a bit or two about Eternal Recurrence. I’m sure most of us think about it one way or the other. Most of the times, probably, in the form of “Is/was there anyone exactly like me out there?” But, imagined upon ourselves, the idea of living the same life over and over again, even though not knowing it (or not being believed by anyone like in the movie above) seems absurd, intolerable, and terrifying; or, as Nietzsche says – “weigh[ing] upon your [our] actions as the greatest stress”. I find it very strange that we hope for similarity, yet when it comes to repetitiveness we are so afraid. The idea of Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence, though, is that it is mainly impossible to be that “well disposed” to be able to accept such a recurrence. So the very thought of reliving the life requires an optimistic view of life… Also, the Eternal Recurrence demands that we make every moment of our lives as interesting and as full as possible.
EndQuote
Let me move on... as I plan to recurr back to Nietzsche someday later on...
I have the strange feeling I'm getting closer to some dangerous truth about US. I'm not discriminating and I'm not criticizing. I'm observing... And I feel the people here are so... unhappy. Perhaps fullfilled, as much as you can say that about one who is not happy in the real meaning. They might be excited or enthusiastic about something, but I've not seem them happy... not as I know happiness is. And, since, like all of us, I would rather not question my judgement until proven guilty, I feel I am right: you are not happy, are you, Americans?
It's like... 99 percent of the people I see everyday don't really honestly communicate; I don't sense that feeling of community, of... symbiosis between two or more people. Where is it? What happened to it? Not even between lovers I don't see it. Maybe it's hidden, maybe it's how it's here...
However I am not an utopist so I will admit that I've seen some people who are contempt and seem to know or have known happiness. Very few, but alive and breathing...
I'm in love. Yes, she's an alien! But she's my fuzzy alien!
I'm sad. Yes, she's away. Yes, I am still looking for my home, again.
I feel peaceful. Could it be the picture?
I feel loved. I feel missed. I feel alone and never alone. I am in the middle of... nothing. Somewhere, everywhere, something somehow will somewhat happen. I feel... too much, too little? Some things cannot be too much. Or too little. This would be a good start for a theory of nothigness
I can't... can I? I can't make you think. I can't make you move. I can't make you curious... I am weak... and you are inert. You are dead... but did I kill you? If we are all so liveless, how can God be alive? What do you feel everyday?... Question that, now not later...
Keep yourself alive.
Thursday, October 19, 2006
[PTP] A frightening reality
"If we had no winter, the spring would not be so pleasant: if we did not sometimes taste of
adversity, prosperity would not be so welcome." - Anne Bradstreet, 'Meditations Divine and Moral,' 1655
Are we really that much utilitarian today, that we cannot consider anything absolute? Does EVERYTHING have to be relative? Why? Why why why?
To quote John (actor Peter MacNicol), from the Ally McBeal series, "this troubles me". Being utilitarian is being practical. Saying that the right thing is that which brings the most good to the greatest number of people - extremely practical.
But shockingly unpleasant. Utilitarianism is also hand-in-hand with consequentialism (a.k.a. only the facts matter), so... if a lawyer can show that a murderer had no intention of killing the victim, then the penalty is milder. But, say, what if - there's always the "what if?" - what if he really did intend to?...
Our society is based on the most practical solution, but our mind is (or should be) inclined towards the other one - called deontological. I suddenly had the feeling that every model we have all had while growing up is fake. Yet, the clichees we experience all around us - about happiness, and doing good, and the lonely "saints" that eventually end up happy, with the love of their lives - yes, they are all illusions. We are mere "numbers" to the society. Is the way the judicial (law) system is built now really the best solution we have come up with in thousands of years of inhabiting this planet?
Einstein said it best: "Only two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity, and I'm not sure about the former."
(picture from here)
"Don't think you are going to conceal thoughts by concealing evidence that they ever existed." - Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech at Dartmouth College, June 14, 1953 - FALSE, you can concieve thoughts. It's all consequences!
"So far, about morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after." - Ernest Hemingway - You said it! This is utilitarianism in it's most horrific form...
Okay. Where am I getting at? Since today is not a very coherent day for me, I'll just say it: Immanuel Kant
For Kant, the morally important thing is not consequences but the way choosers think when they make choices.
Kant says that only one [kind of] thing is inherently good, and that is the good will.
The will
* found in humans but not nonhuman animals
* not a material thing
* it is our power of rational moral choice
* its presence gives humans their inherent dignity
What makes the will good? The will is good when it acts out of duty, not out of inclination.
What does it mean to act out of inclination? To do something because it makes you feel good or because you hope to gain something from it.
What does it mean to act out of duty? Kant says this means that we should act from respect for the moral law.
How do we do that? We must know what the moral law is.
How do we know that? We use the "Categorical Imperative".
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: Act only on those maxims (or rules of action) that you could at the same time will to be a universal law.
Basically, every time you act, you create a universal law. Would you like others to do the same? Would you like to do the same everytime? (Oh, there's a great comedy to illustrate this point - Click (2006) with Adam Sandler:D)
The Categorical Imperative is a rule for testing rules.
Basically it requires the following steps:
* Before you act, consider the maxim or principle on which you are acting.
* Generalize that principle.
* PERFORM TEST ONE.
If, once generalized, it no longer makes any sense because it contradicts itself, then it is wrong to use that maxim as a basis for action.
* IF NECESSARY PERFORM TEST TWO (a.k.a. Reversibility)
If the generalized version makes sense, then ask whether you would choose to live in a world where it was followed by everyone. If not, do not act on that maxim.
(Source for summary on Kant's philosophy here)
Another thing that Kant said, which is equivalent to the Categorical Imperative is "Do not treat others as means to an end (a.k.a. do not use them), rather as ends themselves."
If you wish to read about morality in Kant's vision (and I do recommend the texts, real modern philosophy!), I have gathered a couple of webplaces. Click here for a short writing (the one I've read and commented a bit here). Or follow the links below:
A huge archive of Kant's work
Some texts in various formats, directly linked
So... which are you? Utilitarian? Deontological? I think a part of us are somewhat a bit of both - but most are just... mainly utilitarian. Sad :( Where's the love?
(picture from here)
Thursday, September 14, 2006
[PTP] Aristotle - MY STATEMENT
Picture:Wonder Mountain, Toronto Area, Ontario, Canada
... i know, it doesn't look real...
MY STATEMENT
I think it's amazing, I really do... Just look at what he's saying, carefully: happiness is virtue. Virtue is ... balance, equilibrium, a state of character... So the secret of happiness would be... the middle road? I find that's plausible. I mean, although it's a bit idealistic for a man to be able to judge all these "means" (and he talks about them a lot too, in the next chapters), in my own experience I found that (adolescent) adventures which exceed the mean area are ... actually in there. The activity of doing something which brings you contempt, peace, fulfillment, intensity... all of these, even associated with pleasure (or passion, as he often says), have a MEAN (Aristotle's Golden Mean). It makes sense. And, furthermore, it's extremely well sought by religion, I bet. It's not just a coincidence that it goes way up to our times.
So, the soul is:
1. Vegetative - Plant-like, representing growth and nurturing <=> nature's call of "time to change"
2. Appetitive - Animal-like, full of desire, passion and essentially good/bad feelings (determined by wants and their results as ACTIONS/ACTIVITIES)
3. Rational (Reason) - The one thing that separates us from the rest. This also has to do with self-consciousness, belief, and... most importantly, with virtue and happiness.
Although it may not be clear that this is the way we are, he is right to some extent. You could, almost perfectly, split all of man's existance into three cathegories, and put them each in one of these 1,2,3... Right?
So, in his vision (and somewhat in mine), happiness has nothing to do with anything except... activities of the soul. Although, for me, the deepest and most rewarding activity of the soul is love, (and I am still young, yes, maybe that has a bit to do with it) I also find knowledge, sport, or art, very intense activities. Perhaps there are others... so, to be optimistic, you can look at it this way: there's a thousand ways to be happy! Really! So smile, then think of what is you and do it!
ALSO READ:
Aristotle - The basics
Aristotle - Happiness
[PTP] Aristotle - Happiness
Picture:
Wild Mountain, Owens Valley, California
... peace, or happiness?
The following are: Quotes from Aristotelian Nicomachean Ethics
(Check out www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm for more info)
My comments are in Italic
Book I
8. We must consider it (good), however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our promises, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well (justifying activity as the essence). And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature (could it be any clearer?) . Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself (doesn't that remind you of certain religions of the world?). For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos --
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.(sniff... beautiful!)
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one -- the best -- of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.
9. (this is only if you want to know why only conscientious human beings can be happy:)
For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.
It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.
The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.
It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.
10. [...] For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.13. (what is happiness? what is virtue?)
Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. [...] But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul. [...]
Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question.
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed, and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures; this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them. Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those of ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.
There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul -- one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle.
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of 'accounting for a mathematical property. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father.
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.
Book II
5. Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds -- passions, faculties, states of character -- virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.
For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.
6. (what is virtue, what does it imply?) [...]
We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.
How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little -- and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little -- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this -- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.
[...] (for more details read chapters 6-8 from the website)
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.
9. [...] Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises
ALSO READ:
Aristotle - The basics
Aristotle - MY STATEMENT
[PTP] Aristotle - The basics
Picture:Tuscan Morning, Italy
The beginning might be blurry, but it's just an appearance.
PTP is short from: (The) Path To Philosophy
The following are: Quotes from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
(Check out www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm for more info)
My comments are in Italic
Book I
1. EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity -- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others -- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? [...]
3. Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.
4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.[...]
Great one:
5.[...] To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure (hedonists); which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later. The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking (and this was 2000 years ago!); for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.
6. [...] (see how he reaches a conclusion about good:) Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea.
7. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
(how we know happiness is our goal - read more on the website:) Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
[...] From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others -- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. (This is genius!)
(The way Aristotle describes the soul:)
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.(how can you not like this?)
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Aristotle - Happiness
Aristotle - MY STATEMENT
