Evelyn: Don't worry about 'why' when 'what' is right in front of you. (The Shape of Things)

Sunday, September 24, 2006

[Long story short] Two

Back to One
J: I just remembered...
(silence)
They are lying on the grass again. He, and she, and nobody else. It's dark. Julie and Martin.
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)

M: I love water. Falling water, actually... I felt it again today. It's amazing how feminine it makes me feel: I wanted to kiss the water, to embrace it, to press it against me. I felt like I was not there, but somewhere else... You know, this was really the first day I realized I could feel like that in the shower.
J: It's quite a song water sings, everytime...
M: At one point, after minutes and minutes, I thought you must have showered in it too. Maybe not the same water, but... what if... and, even if not, water's everywhere. It was near you, I felt it; and I also felt close to you because of it... I felt that I could send you my love through the gentle flow, and it would travel oceans and clouds and be right next to you. All the time. Forever... I could've kissed something you touched, right then... I could fly then... and reach out to you...
J: Maybe that's why I like to take a bath, you know... surrounded by water everywhere, I'm... safe. And it's warm, and gentle, and slow... Water is slow and fast, don't you think so? And maybe you are there. I didn't realize...
M: Time was different; I could feel it passing by; so slowly... I turned my back from the shower (cap) and felt the water flowing on my back. And I thought what if you were surprising me, what if you jumped on my back right then. In the wet mirror in front I saw me, slow me... but I was moving so fast, and it was always with me... the water. The water falling... Water falls...
J: Waterfalls.
M: Waterfalls. Let's imagine...
J: A waterfall!
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
(She jumps straight up.)
J: Hey! I didn't scare you?
M: I know. Strange, isn't it? I'm naturally very scared, but not from you. You...
J: I... thought of something. I thought we should draw something together.
M: A waterfall?
J: Maybe...
M: Wow...
J: Hey, I just realized... that water can also kill. How can such a romantic existence do evil?
M: Maybe it's not evil... It doesn't kill by itself...
J: Yeah... yes! Kiss me!
M: You are my waterfall...
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
M: What color are you?
J: Does it matter?
M: Doesn't it?
(silence)
(silence)
J: I ... you.
M: ... you too...
J: Me too. You know what? I'm water! I wanna be water right now. Embrace me, like you did this morning, show me how you felt!
M: You are my waterfall... what if you're green?
(silence)
(silence)
J: I am greenish. I couldn't be green... I'm water!
M: This is your soul, my waterfall. And I can be right in the middle of it. L...
J: (slowly) O...
M: (slowly) V...
J: (slowly) E...
(silence)
M: I want...
J: I WANT... you. But we are only human... and you cannot go through my soul.
M: L-O-V-E
J: But you can be water, and I can be water. And we can feel each other's gentle touch and soft embrace. And we can kiss the flow, and go with it...
(silence)
J: And be together, in the middle of the water, falling.
M: Waterfall.
J: Waterfall!
M: Our waterfall! Hold me from holding you or hold me tight. As tight as you can, because you can't break me. I am water...
(silence)
J: L-O-V-E
(silence)
J: What color am I?
M: Does it matter?
J: Can water fall up?
M: It can evaporate... it can... be a cloud! Let's say it can fall up! I feel I'm falling up, so...
J: I know...
M: ... you
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
M: We can be any color...
J: ... you... too... too.
M: You are white. You are pure...
J: You are blue. You are clear...
M: You are red. You are passionate...
J: You are yellow. You are meditative...
M: You are green. You are natural...
J: You are black. Mysterious...
M: You are pink. Joyful...
J: You are purple. Peaceful...
M: Like the sunset... You are orange. Warm...
J: Like the sun... Brown. Huggable...
M: Like a tree... Tan. Delicate...
J: Like skin... Silver. Purifying...
(silence)
(silence)
(silence)
M: You are my color...
J: You are my color...
M: What color are we?
(silence)
J: Water. Water is our color...
M: We are a waterfall.
J: Water can fall up...
M: Our waterfall...
M&J: (together) Our waterfall!
(silence)
(silence)
J: Kiss me!
(silence)
(silence)
... the end

Find all LSS here

Sink into it! (expand)

Monday, September 18, 2006

[New story] The contemplative seagull

Pictures: Pescadero Beach, CA
Yeah, that's related to the title...

"You don't know what I see out there. You don't even SEE, not to talk about knowing! I am for you like you are for God - just one... encounter. Is it? Maybe... I see...
I see trees of green, red roses too
I see them bloom for me and you
And I think to myself, what a wonderful world

I see skies of blue and clouds of white
The bright blessed day, the dark sacred night
And I think to myself, what a wonderful world

The colours of the rainbow, so pretty in the sky
Are also on the faces of people going by
I see friends shakin' hands, sayin' "How do you do?"
They're really saying "I love you"

I hear babies cryin', I watch them grow
They'll learn much more than I'll ever know
And I think to myself, what a wonderful world
Yes, I think to myself, what a wonderful world
(Louis Armstrong, What a wonderful world)


Yes, it's a wonderful world! But I see the neverending. I see life closer to the essence than can you, because I am part of this world and you are not.
Why are you not, do you know? I'm looking at you, can't you see?

Raise your hand if you've ever felt out of this world. Can't you see, for God's sake (or mine, if not) that you're not even trying? Are you even in touch? 99% of the time you live the life of man. YOU have created this life... and it is not life as any of us, creatures, know it. Your living is for the society, or/and for something virtual. VIRTUAL. What is life to you? Is it really life? What is the life of man? It can't even be called that, anymore. Look at you, you pathetic worm. Okay, I don't mean that. I'm just a bird, what do I know...
No, I'm not upset with you. You shouldn't go away just like that... you should listen to what you don't like, as I hope you still have in you the last bit of humanity to recognize that you are not what you were born to be, you are not... human. Do you think you are?
Look at this. What do you see?
Yes. I have brothers and sisters. Have you?

Look, I don't want you to think too much. I don't want to harm you; but maybe you could feel... the world. Is there a real world? Don't you prefer not to live in it? Why? Why, why, why? Didn't your (man)kind make this world into the 'as is' version of today? Do you hate mankind? Or any man? Why? Do you FEEL yourself? Cause I think you just ignore the very base of your existence - YOU. What is this 'I' people are always talking about? What's your self, personal identity, your being and time?
Why are you alone even with me? I am here, you are here. Other human beings are here, other birds are here. Why, then, you are alone?
So, maybe you did something stupid. Maybe you don't know who you are. If you do, congrats! Would you tell a bird that?... Ehhh, time to think about it...

I still live the old way - fight for the food, look for my love, fly out into the ocean... and even if I get caught in the wave...
... I always remember who I am, and what I'm doing here, in this world...
Do I care about you? Of course I don't.
That's why I'll leave you alone now...
Or should I leave you with your self?"

There's an allegory of the cave, better concerning with the discrepance between what is real and what is imaginary. A preconception of The Matrix, now popular movie, in some way. Long story short, some people are held facing the wall of a cave; they see the shadows of objects projected by fire and eventually one of them breaks free of the "slavery". What happens next, and between, you may see in the text. Although the assumptions or the words may seem a bit out of their place for you (or better said, you might disagree with how thoughts are displayed), the ideas behind the text are marvelous in themselves, and are the beginning of a new thinking. A great quote I found on this is "When facing our reality with another, we are afraid to look behind the shadows, to transcend."

This is it, and here's the link to the text: The Republic, by Plato
Oh, and, if you're interested in debating anything about this post, just... leave a comment ffs! :D

Special thanks to:
Marius, for most of the pictures
Also thanks to:
The "Intro to philosophy" course, and the great "unpredictable laws of nature" (quoting my teacher) for timing this just right.

Thanks for reading thus far. If you want more pictures, just contact me for a link!


What do you think about the above story?
Great! I want more journeys like this one!
Nice. I'd read one from time to time.
Ok, maybe I'll come read one another time.
Sad, I don't like it.
Silly.
Boring.
Free polls from Pollhost.com


Sink into it! (expand)

Thursday, September 14, 2006

[PTP] Aristotle - MY STATEMENT

Picture:
Wonder Mountain, Toronto Area, Ontario, Canada
... i know, it doesn't look real...

MY STATEMENT



Here, that should be all about happiness... right? Well, according to Aristotle, that's not enough. He tries to answer the question "What is justice?", which Plato left unfinished. And he somewhat succeeds! And this happiness discourse is just a part of the bigger picture. Again, for more info, check out the web.
I think it's amazing, I really do... Just look at what he's saying, carefully: happiness is virtue. Virtue is ... balance, equilibrium, a state of character... So the secret of happiness would be... the middle road? I find that's plausible. I mean, although it's a bit idealistic for a man to be able to judge all these "means" (and he talks about them a lot too, in the next chapters), in my own experience I found that (adolescent) adventures which exceed the mean area are ... actually in there. The activity of doing something which brings you contempt, peace, fulfillment, intensity... all of these, even associated with pleasure (or passion, as he often says), have a MEAN (Aristotle's Golden Mean). It makes sense. And, furthermore, it's extremely well sought by religion, I bet. It's not just a coincidence that it goes way up to our times.

So, the soul is:
1. Vegetative - Plant-like, representing growth and nurturing <=> nature's call of "time to change"
2. Appetitive - Animal-like, full of desire, passion and essentially good/bad feelings (determined by wants and their results as ACTIONS/ACTIVITIES)
3. Rational (Reason) - The one thing that separates us from the rest. This also has to do with self-consciousness, belief, and... most importantly, with virtue and happiness.

Although it may not be clear that this is the way we are, he is right to some extent. You could, almost perfectly, split all of man's existance into three cathegories, and put them each in one of these 1,2,3... Right?

So, in his vision (and somewhat in mine), happiness has nothing to do with anything except... activities of the soul. Although, for me, the deepest and most rewarding activity of the soul is love, (and I am still young, yes, maybe that has a bit to do with it) I also find knowledge, sport, or art, very intense activities. Perhaps there are others... so, to be optimistic, you can look at it this way: there's a thousand ways to be happy! Really! So smile, then think of what is you and do it!

ALSO READ:
Aristotle - The basics
Aristotle - Happiness

Sink into it! (expand)

[PTP] Aristotle - Happiness


Picture:
Wild Mountain, Owens Valley, California
... peace, or happiness?


The following are: Quotes from Aristotelian Nicomachean Ethics
(Check out
www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm for more info)
My comments are in Italic

Book I
8.
We must consider it (good), however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our promises, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well (justifying activity as the essence). And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature (could it be any clearer?) . Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself (doesn't that remind you of certain religions of the world?). For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos --

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.(sniff... beautiful!)

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one -- the best -- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

9. (this is only if you want to know why only conscientious human beings can be happy:)

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.

10. [...] For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.

13. (what is happiness? what is virtue?)
Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. [...] But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul. [...]

Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question.

Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed, and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures; this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them. Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those of ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul -- one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle.

Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of 'accounting for a mathematical property. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father.

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.

Book II
5. Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds -- passions, faculties, states of character -- virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed.

Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.


6. (what is virtue, what does it imply?) [...]
We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little -- and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little -- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this -- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.
[...] (for more details read chapters 6-8 from the website)
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.

9. [...] Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises


ALSO READ:
Aristotle - The basics
Aristotle - MY STATEMENT

Sink into it! (expand)

[PTP] Aristotle - The basics

Picture:
Tuscan Morning, Italy
The beginning might be blurry, but it's just an appearance.


PTP is short from: (The) Path To Philosophy

The following are: Quotes from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
(Check out
www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm for more info)

My comments are in Italic

Book I
1. EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity -- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others -- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? [...]

3. Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.[...]

Great one:
5.[...] To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good
, or happiness, with pleasure (hedonists); which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later. The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking (and this was 2000 years ago!); for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.

6. [...] (see how he reaches a conclusion about good:) Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea.
7.
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
(how we know happiness is our goal - read more on the website:)
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

[...] From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others -- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. (This is genius!)

(The way Aristotle describes the soul:)
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.(how can you not like this?)

ALSO:
Aristotle - Happiness
Aristotle - MY STATEMENT

Sink into it! (expand)